DROWN is a cross-protocol attack where the bugs in SSL 2.0 can be used to attack the security of connections that use TLS. The vulnerability applies to servers:
Although no modern browsers support any version of SSL, a DROWN attack would not require the browser client to make an SSL 2.0 connection. DROWN is also not a protocol downgrade attack. As such, mitigations that commonly work against those types of attack are ineffective.
The DROWN vulnerability is based on the Bleichenbacher attack from 1998. DROWN also takes advantage of SSL 2.0’s weak anti-Bleichenbacher countermeasure and weak export ciphers. The attack can be performed in about 8 hours for a cost of about $440 on Amazon EC2.
DROWN exploits the conflict between minimum privileges and backwards compatibility. Although SSL 2.0 was never secure and should only have been deployed for about a year, it was kept in products as a fallback protocol to support SSL 2.0 based clients.
The IETF provided little guidance for removing support for obsolete protocols and algorithms from Web component implementations until RFC6176 in 2011. The cost and delay associated with the shift from SHA-1 to SHA-2 gives us another example of how poorly some legacy products handle protocol and algorithm agility.
For testing, the DROWN researchers provide a test that will check if the corresponding server appears to be vulnerable. Our SSL Server Test may also provide information, but that test is still experimental.
SSL/TLS best practices demand that server administrators consider the following steps to mitigate DROWN: